This document consolidates the defamation, harassment, business-interference, platform-publication and financial-loss records concerning Anthony “Soul” Brodie, the sole developer and operator of Legion Killfeed.
The record extends across several years and multiple services. It includes false accusations of paedophilia, fraud, hacking, file theft, token abuse, malicious code, server sabotage, drug abuse and criminal conduct; doxxing; suicide encouragement; rape and family threats; review bombing; search amplification; and repeated platform handling after detailed notice.
Mathew Trojanowski stole Legion's code and used Skynet, linked accounts, false reviews, Reddit publications, Discord interference and an account carrying Brodie's child's name to attack the service from its beta period through July 2026. Edward Griggs, Mason Stockton, Joel Walker, Danny Hayes, Daniel Santos, Brett Jones and Ray Smith extended the campaign through threats, doxxing, suicide encouragement, family targeting, false criminal accusations, review bombing, customer steering and repeated republication.
Trustpilot, Meta, Reddit, Discord and Google received the source material, identities, customer records, edit histories, account links and formal notices. They kept the publications active through review restoration, report rejection, deleted rebuttals, punishment of the reporting account, search amplification and platform-authored warnings that added new reputational and commercial harm.
Mathew Trojanowski stole Legion's code, operated the Skynet campaign through the Kamikaze, Kamy, Kyle, Killfeed review and Anthony accounts, published the beta-period Reddit attack and used an account carrying Brodie's child's name. Edward Griggs joined the Skynet attack, encouraged suicide, targeted Brodie's partner and children and repeated false accusations through public posts and reviews. Mason Stockton published Brodie's address, used the Links, Havasu and Pups identities, attacked Legion while operating Whitelist.gg and steered customers toward competing services. Joel Walker used his Facebook group and competing killfeed to spread false paedophilia, meth and server-sabotage accusations. Danny Hayes, Daniel Santos and Brett Jones expanded the review-bombing and reporting attack. Ray Smith turned a disclosed support limitation into false accusations of deception, review suppression and unlawful trade practices after the preserved support chronology contradicted his account.
Trustpilot kept false competitor and customer reviews online, refused complete disassociation, published its own consumer warning on 11 July and on 19 July threatened a minimum six-month warning, account restrictions, a hidden TrustScore, removal from search distribution and legal action. Its 11 and 19 July enforcement messages copied revenuetechnology+ceur@trustpilot.com. Meta left eight tracked posts visible after 176 reports. Reddit kept the beta-period attack online and banned a reporting profile. Discord retained thirty exported tickets plus ticket 66248829 while repeatedly punishing the reporting account. Google distributed the same accusations through search snippets and generated answers across 220 handling entries, 71 evidence rows, 71 ticket references, 77 URL entries and 19 request IDs. eSafety and the ACCC routed complaints without stopping the publications. OAIC matters WEB-CP-26-08655 and CP26/03054 and the Danish Data Protection Agency complaint sent to dt@datatilsynet.dk were escalated while Trustpilot continued the reviews, warning and enforcement action.
Valuation basis: the figures use the cleaned subscription ledger, the 506 dated mitigation-work entries, the 17-month beta development record, the measured publication periods and the alternative A$35, A$65, A$95 and A$130 replacement rates detailed below.
| Service | Preserved scope | Business harm | Position at 5 August 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 thread, comments, moderation, legal and account records | Search-indexed claims remained a trust barrier through the beta-to-paid transition and beyond | One Legion profile banned; repeated notices unanswered; hostile material continued to surface | |
| Meta / Facebook | Group posts, comments, report histories, support inbox exports and formal notices | Claims reached DayZ communities used for customer acquisition and repeatedly pulled family material into the dispute | Reports were rejected or fragmented; the underlying pattern was not resolved |
| Search results, snippets, AI summaries, legal-removal cases and Lumen-related records | Hostile material was presented as neutral search and generated-answer content | Google alternated between claimed fixes, reversals, requests for the same facts and continued surfacing | |
| Trustpilot | Review versions, ratings, reports, appeals, notices, profile reversals and consumer-warning records | One-star publications affected purchase-stage trust and star ratings; the consumer warning added Trustpilot’s own adverse publication | Four false one-star publications are visible: two under Ray Smith, one under Kyle and the “Killfeed review”; the consumer warning is also visible |
| Discord | Threats, impersonation, doxxing, mass-report activity, account restrictions and later reversals | Harassment and enforcement disruption occurred on the platform used to deliver the service | Some punishments were reversed, but the operational and evidentiary burden remained |
| Category | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| General damages | A$460,000 | A$500,000 | A$520,000 |
| Aggravated damages | A$500,000 | A$800,000 | A$1,200,000 |
| Special damages | A$442,584 | A$667,223 | A$909,674 |
| Total before interest and costs | A$1,402,584 | A$1,967,223 | A$2,629,674 |
The valuation includes the 2026 general-damages maximum, the multi-year mitigation burden, the loss of beta-built trust and goodwill, and the continuing July 2026 Trustpilot publications. The full A$289,000 to A$578,000 beta replacement value is included once in every scenario. It is not erased or replaced with a smaller generic goodwill allowance. Applying developer rates to the same mitigation hours produces the alternative A$1,524,024 to A$3,398,794 valuation detailed in Section 11.
Legion Killfeed is a Discord-based automated killfeed and server analytics service for the DayZ gaming community on consoles. Soul is the sole developer, operator, and proprietor. The service provides real-time kill notifications and server metrics to DayZ game server communities via Discord bots.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Total Addressable Market (TAM) | Jeabers cumulative unique baseline (not concurrent active): 9,140 servers / 2,222,899 players (historical tracked total). Jeabers active final snapshot baseline: 3,709 Nitrado servers / 3,179,161 players. |
| Total Nitrado Servers Using Legion (since beta) | ~1,272 servers (cumulative unique footprint) |
| Cumulative Server Penetration vs Jeabers (9,140 unique) | ~13.9% (1,272 / 9,140) |
| Cumulative Server Penetration vs Jeabers active final snapshot (3,709 Nitrado) | ~34.3% (1,272 / 3,709) |
| Peak Reference Share (proxy vs active final snapshot) | 4.58% (170 / 3,709 servers - April 2025) |
| Trough Reference Share (proxy vs active final snapshot) | 2.40% (89 / 3,709 servers - Dec 2025) |
| Competitive Landscape | 4-6 competing killfeed bots exist (DayZKillfeed.com, Killfeed.Dev, DayZ++, Laws Killfeed, DayZero Killfeed, SkyNet and more) - only one offers Legion's global functionality with accuracy and comparable technical advancements (Note: SkyNet is built off stolen Legion code and would not exist without it) |
| Player Base Capture | 1,273,369 players tracked (per bot statistics, 21 Oct 2025) - 57.3% of the Jeabers cumulative unique playerbase (1,273,369 / 2,222,899) and 40.1% of the Jeabers active final snapshot playerbase (1,273,369 / 3,179,161), reached at a fraction of the total server count (13.9% cumulative server penetration). |
| Industry Contribution | Identified and reported a caching flaw to Bohemia Interactive that improved global CPU usage by ~40% |
February 2023 - June 2024: Legion Killfeed ran as a free beta for 17 months, approximately 516 days, before paid subscriptions began in late June 2024. Brodie's existing development estimate is 4,446 hours. Mathew Trojanowski’s 24 January 2024 Reddit publication arrived during that beta, became search-visible and damaged the trust-building and customer-conversion purpose of the free period before the paid launch. The financial model therefore records a stranded beta/goodwill component without simply adding the software’s full replacement value.
The detailed subscription-loss calculation is kept once only in Section 9 - Financial Damages. It uses the non-anonymised payment ledger only, excludes unrelated payment categories, and excludes partial months until a complete renewal-cycle export exists.
| Name | Alias(es) | Location | Role | Competing Service |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mathew Trojanowski | Kamikaze, Kami, Obviously_Mario, Brief_Ordinary1438 | Nevada, USA | Primary orchestrator - Reddit thread starter, Trustpilot reviewer, code theft, DoS planning and coordinated activity with former DayZBoosterZ collaborators | Skynet Killfeed / Anon PVP |
| Edward Griggs Jr. | Crix, Crix Madine Jr, Eddie Griggs | USA | Skynet staff; suicide encouragement, pedo accusations, comments targeting Brodie's children and Trustpilot review | Skynet Killfeed staff / BigFatMods |
| Joel L. Walker | Jack Jackelope | USA | 7 Facebook posts including 3 explicit pedo accusations - 42+ reports, still visible | Make DayZ Great Again Killfeed |
| Mason Lewis Stockton | Links, havasu, Pups | UK | Doxxing (home address), Trustpilot competitor review and Discord alt abuse; while a DayZ++ partner, used the Pups account to approach Legion customers and steer them toward DayZ++ | whitelist.gg / DayZ++ partner |
| Danny Hayes | - | UK | Self-identified competitor, coordinated Trustpilot review bombing, called for fraudulent chargebacks | Unnamed rival service |
| Ray Smith | R_y_smith, R-y_smith, R_ y_ smith | UK profile location | Former subscriber; subscription activated at 11:48 PM on 9 April 2026. At 2:42 AM on 10 April he asked about the shop/trader feature and Brodie immediately said he was fixing a bug. His Discord had fewer than 50 members. He manufactured complaint bait by repeatedly offering payment for things Legion neither charges for nor advertises, misattributed automated bot responses, described access as revoked after the removal log recorded Legion being removed from his server, and replaced the review with deception, report-manipulation and expanded business-misconduct accusations | No competing service attribution established |
| Anthony Buchanan | OzzieHousos, UntoldTruthy | Australia | Competitor and former DayZBoosterZ collaborator; Anthony Buchanan was the name on the review posted directly after OzzieHousos used UntoldTruthy to call Brodie a "pedo" when Brodie refused to work with him. Ronald Lund's later PayPal purchase trail for DayZBoosterZ.com identifies t.showler inside Lund's separate purchase record; that identifier is not substituted for Buchanan's documented review identity | DayZBoosterZ.com |
| Daniel Santos | DANI23COVID, SANTOZ, santoz0790 | USA | Customer who also provides paid DayZ modding services; initiated the July 2025 Facebook brigading post (#TeamKami) | Paid DayZ modding services |
| Brett Jones | MrTechN9ne | Canada | Former customer. A former member of Jones' own staff described Jones as an alcoholic; that description did not originate with Brodie. Jones first cancelled when direct-message permissions were disabled, later returned, then joined the pile-on. A different customer reported what Jones had been saying in an Xbox party. Jones amplified the Reddit thread and made paedophile comments. | - |
| Ronald "Jarvis" Lund | Jarvis, DayZKillfeed.com | USA | Original antagonist (2020), code theft, threat to "crush" competitors | DayZKillfeed.com |
| Adam Cooper | - | - | Never a customer; published third-party amplification inside Joel Walker's group and campaign chain | - |
Shared DayZBoosterZ history: The record links Mathew Trojanowski, Edward Griggs Jr., Mason Stockton, Anthony Buchanan and Ronald Lund through coordinated conduct. All five were staff, partners or collaborators working together around DayZBoosterZ at one point. That shared history is material when later posts, alternate accounts, reviews and competitor promotions are assessed together rather than as isolated customer complaints. When Lund bought DayZBoosterZ.com, the PayPal purchase and related email trail identified t.showler. Anthony Buchanan was the name presented on the earlier competitor review immediately after the OzzieHousos/UntoldTruthy paedophilia smear. The record keeps Lund's t.showler purchase identifier separate from Buchanan's documented review identity.
The publications carry the following defamatory imputations, each of which is demonstrably false:
| Imputation | Severity | Platforms Published |
|---|---|---|
| Pedophilia - "Soul is a pedo," "kiddy fiddler" | Most serious - a catastrophic accusation of child sexual abuse | Facebook (3+ posts), Discord |
| Fraud / Scamming - "known scammer," "steals files," "takes money and deletes server" | Serious | Reddit (multiple), Trustpilot (multiple), Facebook |
| Criminal Sabotage - "reset loop your server," "code has malicious intent" | Serious | Facebook, Reddit |
| Drug Use - "smokes meth on the regular" | Serious | |
| Professional Incompetence - "chatgpt coder," "no security experience," "broken bots" | Moderate | Trustpilot, Reddit, Discord |
| Code Theft - accused of stealing others' code (ironically, the reverse is true) | Moderate | Reddit, Discord |
Aggravating context: These imputations were not published in a vacuum. Griggs and Trojanowski had already encouraged Brodie to kill himself, while Griggs made comments about Brodie's children and the campaign circulated or targeted material involving them. Buchanan, using the UntoldTruthy account, also called Brodie a "pedo". That surrounding conduct gives the later pedophilia, criminality and professional-incompetence publications a darker meaning: they continued a personal campaign involving suicide encouragement and Brodie's children, not an ordinary product dispute.
All accusations are fabrications. Soul has never been accused, charged, or suspected by any authority of any sex offence, fraud, or criminal conduct. Transaction logs disprove "theft" and "sabotage" claims. The code theft accusation is inverted - the primary orchestrator (Trojanowski) stole Soul's code (confirmed via GitHub commit history: Soul authored 457 of 590 commits, 77.5%).
Serious harm - s 10A. The criminal and sexual imputations, years of republication, search visibility, subscription loss, customer cancellation, family targeting and psychological harm establish cumulative serious harm to Brodie and his sole-trader business.
Publication - Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller [2021] HCA 27. Voller held that operators of public Facebook pages were publishers of third-party comments they facilitated and encouraged. Trustpilot's review restoration, profile editing and consumer warning, Meta's group administration and report decisions, Reddit's moderation, Discord's enforcement and Google's generated summaries are addressed under their actual publishing functions and the current NSW intermediary provisions.
Digital intermediaries - ss 10C and 10D. Section 10C exempts qualifying caching, conduit and storage services where the intermediary's role remains limited and it did not initiate, select recipients for, encourage, edit or promote the matter. Section 10D exempts automated search results and linked matter where the provider's role is limited to the automated search process, subject to the paid-promotion exception. Both exemptions can apply even where the intermediary knew or should have known of the content. Notice alone therefore does not defeat them. Trustpilot's own warning is analytically different from a user review, and Google's generated answers require separate technical proof about how each output was produced and whether it falls within the statutory definition.
Digital-intermediary defence - s 31A. A digital intermediary relying on this defence must show an accessible complaint mechanism and, after a qualifying written complaint, reasonable access-prevention steps within seven days if steps were available. The seven-day period is a condition of that defence, not a free-standing statutory command that every disputed publication must be removed.
Access prevention - s 39A. A court may order a non-party digital intermediary to take access-prevention steps even if that intermediary is not liable in damages, but only in defamation proceedings where the plaintiff has obtained judgment or the court has granted the temporary or final injunction or order described in s 39A(1). The intermediary must ordinarily be heard, subject to the urgent temporary-order exception.
Damages - ss 34 and 35. Damages must bear a rational relationship to the harm. From 1 July 2026 the maximum damages amount for non-economic loss is A$520,000; the maximum is reserved for the most serious cases. Aggravated damages are assessed separately. Interest and costs are matters for the court and are not inserted as a flat percentage in this model. The amount and commencement date are recorded in the 25 June 2026 uniform-law Gazette declaration.
Single damages sum - s 39. Where the court finds for the plaintiff on more than one cause of action, it may assess damages in a single sum. That provision fits the evidence here: the publications and platform decisions operated together as one coordinated attack and caused cumulative harm that cannot be understood by artificially isolating each surface.
Overview: The Trustpilot record covers 24 negative-review and notification records, repeated changes in review state, rating impact, reports, appeals, legal notices and a July 2026 consumer warning. Trustpilot repeatedly republished competitor reviews after notice, authored its own consumer warning, reversed Legion's profile notice and applied legal and reputational pressure while directing Legion to Trustpilot-controlled display tools.
Notice history: Trustpilot received notice trails in 2024, 2025 and 2026. The archive records review removal, restoration, filtering, investigation, category-specific refusals and repeated demands that the complete history be considered instead of treating every new report as isolated.
Brand-enforcement escalation: Trustpilot first issued brand notice 28609776 on 17 September 2024. On 3 July 2026, thread D271PM4ufOywb9S1Yc15p2A called Legion's customer-review display “scraping”, gave seven days to remove it and directed Legion to widgets in “Share & promote”. On 11 July, thread KkkJMwaPdeyY2Tdw5N-iCWA announced a consumer warning and another seven-day deadline. On 19 July, thread 1JxOs0eHf4iiFK5iDKMCQ2A escalated to a minimum six-month warning, account restrictions, a hidden TrustScore, removal from search distribution and legal action. The 2026 escalation followed Trustpilot's receipt of the legal, privacy and profile-removal demands while it continued publishing the false reviews and refused to disassociate Legion from its platform.
What the captured pages show: the image embedded in the 3 July email shows review cards labelled “Trustpilot Review” with five-star graphics. The image embedded in the 19 July notice shows the later label “Product & Service Review”, still with star graphics. Neither captured page shows a Trustpilot logo, TrustScore or TrustBox. Brodie's replies state that no widget, API, crawler, automated scraper or copied database was used. Trustpilot's preserved messages identify no extraction method or technical scraping evidence; the emails simply apply that label to the display.
Review ownership and permission: Trustpilot's 16 July email states that reviews are user-generated content owned by the reviewers. The customer statements displayed on killfeed.co were republished with reviewer permission and without a Trustpilot widget, API, crawler, scraper, copied database or live Trustpilot feed. Trustpilot nevertheless demanded their removal and directed Legion toward Trustpilot-controlled display products while refusing to remove the false publications attached to Legion's forced profile.
Trustpilot used criminal commercial coercion and attempted extortion. After formal notice, it demanded removal of authorised customer statements from Legion's own website, directed Legion toward Trustpilot-controlled display products, threatened a public warning, account restrictions, a hidden TrustScore, removal from search distribution and legal action, refused complete disassociation, and continued publishing false reviews. The enforcement messages repeatedly copied revenuetechnology+ceur@trustpilot.com, and Trustpilot made continuing reputational and commercial harm the consequence of refusing its demand.
| Category | Count | Identities |
|---|---|---|
| Confirmed competitors | 10 review identities | Kamy, havasu/Mason Stockton, Anthony Buchanan/OzzieHousos, Danny Hayes, Edward Anthony Griggs Jr., Joel Walker, Kyle, “Killfeed review”, Unholy and the “Anthony” notification account. Kamy, Kyle, “Killfeed review” and the “Anthony” account are Mathew Trojanowski account presentations. Anthony Buchanan is the separate competing DayZBoosterZ operator. |
| Confirmed non-customers | 3+ | Trevor Gonzales (no system records), Z Doneskies (self-described observer), and Consumer/Hooded_Saw (no matching subscription record; the paying subscriber was a different account holder), plus other rows where Trustpilot ignored off-platform records showing no genuine service-use basis |
| Other campaign or pile-on participants | 9+ | Karl Messer, Brandon, Robert McDonovan, WARZONE, "Cunt", Consumer/Hooded_Saw, Ray Smith / R-y_smith and other pile-on records |
| # | Reviewer | Posted | Days Visible | Reinstatements | Key Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Kyle | 2024-06-04 | 559 | 6 | Visible 2024-06-04 to 2025-12-11, reinstated 2026-02-11 then removed 2026-02-13. Attributed here to Kamikaze / Mathew Trojanowski. |
| 2 | havasu | 2024-08-28 | 18 | 2 | PERIOD 1: Aug 28 - Sep 13, 2024 (17 days) - Single continuous period. |
| 3 | Anthony Buchanan | 2024-09-13 | 9 | 1 | PERIOD 1: Sep 13-19, 2024 (7 days). Anthony Buchanan/OzzieHousos operated the competing DayZBoosterZ service. Trustpilot restored the review after removal and later admitted the restoration was a technical error. |
| 4 | Karl Messer | 2024-11-05 | 157 | 6 | PERIOD 1: Nov 5 - Dec 2, 2024 (28 days) - Initial publication, removed before Dec 3. |
| 5 | Brandon | 2024-11-26 | 24 | 2 | PERIOD 1: Nov 26 - Dec 6, 2024 (11 days) - Initial publication. |
| 6 | Trevor Gonzales | 2025-05-28 | 5 | 2 | PERIOD 1: May 28, 2025 (1 day) - Initial posting. |
| 7 | Danny Hayes | 2025-08-01 | 4 | 6 | PERIOD 1: Aug 1-4, 2025 (4 days) - Single continuous period. |
| 8 | WARZONE | 2025-08-01 | 14 | 7 | PERIOD 1: Aug 1, 2025 (1 day) - Initial publication. |
| 9 | Cunt | 2025-08-02 | 4 | 3 | ORIGINAL POST DATE 2025-08-02 PERIOD 1 (REINSTATED): Aug 2-5, 2025 (4 days) - Evidence explicitly confirms 'Cunt review Reinstated 2nd of August' and 'Cunt review full slander - Reinstated 2nd of August' as part of massi |
| 10 | Robert McDonovan | 2025-08-05 | 15 | 6 | PERIOD 1: Aug 5, 2025 (1 day) - Initial publication. |
| 11 | Z Doneskies | 2025-08-09 | 11 | 7 | PERIOD 1: Aug 9-19, 2025 (11 days) - Z Doneskies explicitly admitted being observer rather than customer ('it was just a sad sight to see') with no direct service experience. |
| 12 | Consumer | 2025-11-29 | 84 | 9 | The same review/account trail was presented as Consumer and Hooded_Saw. It appeared on 29 November 2025, six days before the first Kamy review, and was being reported and republished during the same early-December cluster. Visible for 80 days total across 2 visibility periods. Additional Trustpilot review URL observed in evidence: https://www.trustpilot.com/reviews/665c96997022422e513a9d80. |
| 13 | Kamy | 2025-12-05 | 5 | 11 | PERIOD 1: Dec 5-9, 2025 (5 days) - Initial publication. |
| 14 | Unholy | 2025-12-05 | 2 | 2 | PERIOD 1: Dec 5-6, 2025 (2 days) - Unholy review explicitly promoted competitor 'DZB killfeed' stating 'I would high recommend using any other bot, Such as DZB killfeed'. |
| 15 | Kamy | 2025-12-08 | 8 | 1 | PERIOD 1: Dec 8-15, 2025 (8 days) - Second review by same user after first was disputed. |
| 16 | Edward Anthony Griggs Jr. | 2026-01-17 | 4 | 1 | PERIOD 1: Jan 17-20, 2026 (4 days) - Edward Anthony Griggs Jr. |
| 17 | Edward Anthony Griggs Jr. | 2026-01-17 | 2 | 0 | Visible ~2 days (Trustpilot shows "2 days ago" on 2026-01-19) then hidden and marked Investigating after being flagged for defamation. |
| 18 | Ray Smith / R-y_smith | 2026-05-25 | 51 | 5 | Review notification received 2026-05-25 at 23:08; the Ray Smith publication remained visible through the latest directly preserved confirmation used for the conservative publication-day total. |
| 19 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-18 | Index record | 0 | Legion Killfeed one-star review mirrored the wider Facebook and Reddit smear wording; removed/handled as part of the April 2026 review-abuse trail. |
| 20 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-18 | Index record | 0 | DayZ Multi Tool one-star review using broad community-abuse accusations. On 1 August 2026, case 01757662 says Trustpilot removed the review after a defamation flag and after the reviewer did not edit or delete it. The removal is recorded, but this row is not added to the cumulative publication-day figure without a preserved continuous visibility record. |
| 21 | Ray Smith | 2026-07-10 | 5 | 3 | Second visible Ray Smith review/publication. It is not treated as a duplicate source record in the current-publication count. |
| 22 | Kyle | 2026-07-01 UTC / 2 July AEST | 14 | 3 | Generic website/mobile/readability one-star review, currently visible. Attributed here to Kamikaze / Mathew Trojanowski. |
| 23 | Killfeed review | 2026-07-01 UTC / 2 July AEST | 14 | 4 | Generic website/mobile/readability one-star review, currently visible. The same Trustpilot profile includes a 2023 TeamViewer reply addressing the reviewer as Mathew; attributed here to Kamikaze / Mathew Trojanowski. |
| 24 | Anthony | 2026-07-03 | Notification record; no retained public profile capture | 0 | Trustpilot notified Legion of a new one-star review using the “Anthony” name and an account presentation attributed to Mathew Trojanowski. We are treating this as a taunt at Anthony Brodie. Trustpilot didn't let this one display but refuses to remove the other two near-identical versions |
Account and timing attribution: Kamy, Kyle, “Killfeed review” and the “Anthony” notification account are attributed to Mathew Trojanowski. Consumer and Hooded_Saw are two presentations in the same review/account trail, not two independent satisfied-or-dissatisfied customers. That review appeared on 29 November 2025; the two Kamy reviews followed on 5 and 8 December. Consumer/Hooded_Saw, Kamy and the competitor-promoting Unholy review were therefore a tightly grouped publication and republication cluster. The displayed names remain in the table because they are the names Trustpilot published or used in its records.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Tracked 1-star review and notification records | 24 |
| Preserved Trustpilot report/email records | 608 preserved correspondence records through 1 August |
| Tracked Trustpilot case/thread references | 168 |
| Trustpilot dashboard display | Excluded from every total — the system display is incomplete and inaccurate |
| Competitor review identities | 10, including four Mathew Trojanowski account presentations |
| Confirmed non-customers / non-service-use rows | 2+ |
| Itemised reinstatement or reactivation decisions | 87 minimum through 5 August 2026 |
| Documented refusal-date entries | 86 |
| Cumulative review-publication days | At least 1,038 directly confirmed under the conservative publication-day method |
| Currently public on profile | 4 false one-star publications: 2 Ray Smith, 1 Kyle and 1 “Killfeed review” |
Trustpilot totals: the preserved correspondence contains 608 report/email records, 168 case/thread references and 87 keep-online or reinstatement decisions through 5 August 2026. The totals come from the retained correspondence and decision ledger rather than Trustpilot's incomplete and inaccurate dashboard.
Decision and publication update: the decision total rose from 82 to 87 when Trustpilot kept Kyle online on 16 July, kept “Killfeed review” and Ray Smith online on 17 July, kept “Killfeed review” online again in case 03085556 on 20 July, and kept Ray Smith online in thread dOI9wKZuetuDXeNcmgy5KmA on 21 July.
The second Ray Smith publication is directly confirmed through 25 July, adding five publication days and raising the minimum cumulative publication period from 1,033 to 1,038 days. The other three live publications remain counted only through their latest preserved confirmation rather than being extended without evidence.
1 August / 5 August update: case 01757662 records Trustpilot removing Joel Walker's DayZ Multi Tool review after a defamation flag. On 5 August, OAIC acknowledged Brodie's further update to privacy complaint CP26/03054 alleging that Trustpilot's SAR response and later enforcement left rectification, erasure, restriction and objection requests unresolved. OAIC receipt is an intake acknowledgement, not a merits finding. The 1,038-day publication total remains conservative rather than back-filling unpreserved visibility days.
| Date and reference | Source record | Action | Result and significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 September 2024, ticket 28609776; 3 July 2026, D271PM4ufOywb9S1Yc15p2A | 2024 brand notice · 3 July email and embedded capture · 5 July response | Trustpilot labelled Legion's authorised customer-review cards “scraping”, ordered their removal within seven days and directed Legion toward Trustpilot's display tools. | The demand began the July escalation despite no widget, API, crawler, scraper, copied database or live Trustpilot feed being used. Brodie rejected the accusation and confirmed reviewer permission. |
| 11 July 2026, KkkJMwaPdeyY2Tdw5N-iCWA and profile-misuse thread | consumer-alert warning · profile-misuse email | Trustpilot announced its own consumer warning, threatened further enforcement, removed the legal-notice profile wording and copied a Revenue Technology address. | Trustpilot converted the dispute into platform-authored reputational harm after receiving the legal and privacy demands, while continuing the false reviews and forced profile. |
| 15 July 2026, Ray Smith notice | nine-page cease-and-desist and transmission record | Brodie served both recorded addresses, confirmed Smith's former customer status, set out the full support chronology and demanded correction, cessation and preservation. | Smith did not correct or retract the false review by the deadline and the publication remained part of Trustpilot's live rating and profile. |
| 16 July 2026, D9JR3-vQf9K2fFaX_ZDXDWa | profile and review-status correspondence | Trustpilot confirmed that it automatically creates business profiles, refused complete removal and listed the current review and report outcomes. | Legion remained forcibly associated with Trustpilot while Brodie repeated the legal notice, demanded erasure and cited OAIC matters WEB-CP-26-08655 and CP26/03054. |
| 16 July 2026, T_W86eSqfYOqFeEKD5auFmA | subject-access acknowledgment | Trustpilot acknowledged receipt of the subject-access request on 11 July and set a one-calendar-month response period. | The acknowledged deadline was 11 August while the warning, forced profile, blocked reporting and review enforcement continued during the response period. |
| 16–17 July 2026, mJ98epAcc0GZSMGtBJitrWA, 03058920 and 03058922 | Kyle decision, internally dated 16 July 7:31 PM · “Killfeed review” decision · Ray Smith decision | Trustpilot kept Kyle, “Killfeed review” and Ray Smith online after receiving the account links, customer records, support chronology and legal notices. | The decisions added three more keep-online outcomes, extended the rating damage and preserved false accusations presented as independent customer experiences. |
| 19 July 2026, 3:41 AM | Ray Smith follow-up | Brodie recorded that Smith had not answered the 15 July demand by the 18 July deadline. | Smith left the false deception, reporting-manipulation and unlawful-trade accusations public instead of correcting the support chronology. |
| 19 July 2026, 6:04 PM; profile captured 20 July | final cease-and-desist · Brodie's formal response · public profile capture | Trustpilot threatened another warning, account restrictions, a hidden TrustScore, removal from search distribution and legal action. The public profile still displayed Trustpilot's warning the next day. | Brodie rejected the cease-and-desist, identified the warning as retaliatory adverse action and criminal commercial coercion, and demanded withdrawal, disclosure, preservation and complete disassociation. |
| 20 July 2026, NXy4Mr_ddYCh9SeaTrTcG2A and 03085556 | profile-removal refusal · “Killfeed review” decision | Trustpilot again refused complete profile removal and again kept Mathew Trojanowski's “Killfeed review” publication online. | The two template refusals extended the forced association and publication damage and triggered the immediate psychological crisis recorded in Brodie's replies. |
| 20 July 2026, 9:29 AM subject-access clarification | Brodie's clarification | Brodie expanded the requested categories to include the review decisions, warning, profile changes, blocked reporting, monitoring, Revenue Technology involvement and threatened search and account penalties. | The clarification maintained the original 11 August deadline and required disclosure of the internal decision trail behind every July adverse action. |
| 23 July 2026, 2:17 AM and 2:25 AM | first edited-review notice · second notice eight minutes later | Ray Smith withdrew the false FTC and American-policy premise and corrected Legion to Australia, but retained the accusations of deception, lying, review suppression and manipulation. | Trustpilot continued publishing the accusation after formal notice, restriction and deletion demands. |
| 21–25 July 2026, dOI9wKZuetuDXeNcmgy5KmA | keep-online decision and deletion-demand reply | Trustpilot said the non-specific review did not need to name the business, refused action and redirected Legion to engagement or another appeal. | The refusal ignored the repeated GDPR and local-law deletion demand while the forced profile, false warning and accusation remained public. |
Trustpilot's direct responsibility: Trustpilot became an active publisher when it authored the consumer warning, reversed the legal-notice profile wording, selected which false reviews to restore, refused complete disassociation and threatened account, search and legal penalties. Those were Trustpilot's own decisions after detailed notice, not passive storage of user content.
Ray Smith was a genuine subscriber. That fact does not make the published chronology accurate. He was activated at 11:48 PM on 9 April 2026. At 2:42 AM on 10 April he asked for help setting up a working store, and Brodie replied in the same minute that he was fixing a bug in it. That is the timestamped record; the earlier “within 19 minutes” wording was not supported by the displayed exchange. His Discord had fewer than 50 members. On 25 May 2026 he asked whether Legion could operate beside DayZ++, said he would use another bot and return when the feature was fixed, and removed Legion from his server before the later argument.
Smith manufactured complaint bait by repeatedly offering payment for work and features that Legion did not sell or advertise as part of the subscription, framing the conversation around competitor bots, and later presenting those rejected offers as a paid-service dispute. His small server, repeated payment offers and rewritten public account show a deliberate attempt to create a complaint that the actual subscription and support exchange did not support.
The system record says Legion was removed from Smith's server at 11:00 AM on 25 May and identifies Smith's subscribed account as the owner; a separate leave log records that account leaving Legion's support server at 8:30 PM. That is the evidence against his later wording that Brodie revoked access with 16 paid days remaining. It also shows that the “crayons” responses were posted by the automated Legion Support Manager after Brodie used triggering words, rather than being the exact sentence Smith attributed personally to Brodie. The conversation later became mutually hostile; that context is preserved rather than hidden.
By 13 July Ray had replaced the service account with a false description of Legion's location and governing business context, then accused it of deceptive practices, knowingly making false competitor claims, manipulating Trustpilot's reporting system, suppressing legitimate feedback and committing unfair trade practices. Legion is an Australian sole-trader business. The edit turned a support dispute into direct accusations of dishonesty and unlawful commercial conduct.
Trustpilot had the Discord chronology, the bot attribution, the Australian business location, the July review cluster and the legal notices. Its 13 July notification presented the changed wording as the response to the complaint, while the replacement removed one false account description and published worse accusations. The preserved screen recording shows that the visible interface did not provide an effective route to report the newly substituted claims.
On 15 July, Brodie served Ray Smith with a nine-page Open Letter of Claim. The letter expressly accepts that Smith was a customer; it does not describe customer status as false. It compares the original and rewritten reviews with the support record, including the early shop-feature disclosure, Smith's own cancellation and bot removal, the later terms-based termination, the automated source of the “crayons” reply, Legion's Australian location and the absence of an identified FTC finding. It requests cessation, correction and evidence preservation, with an initial response in 48 hours and a substantive response in 14 days.
Overview: Facebook hosts the most visceral defamatory content - including explicit pedophilia accusations published in DayZ gaming groups that function as direct customer acquisition channels. The scorecard records 14 posts by 5 posters, 176 total reports, and 2,342 cumulative days visible. 8 of 14 posts remain VISIBLE as of 5 August 2026.
Concerns Notice Date: 2025-08-14 (Meta Facebook Concerns Notice served). Earlier informal notice through Meta's reporting system from mid-2025. Live chat with Meta staff on 2025-11-02 documented: staff member "Adi" acknowledged the issue, left to "investigate," returned with a scripted deflection after the complainant waited 10+ hours.
| # | Poster | Date | Content | Days Visible | Reports | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Daniel Santos | 2025-07-28 | Customer and paid DayZ modding provider: "piece of shit" + #TeamKami - triggered Trustpilot campaign | 45 | 14 | REMOVED |
| 2 | Adam Cooper | 2025-10-24 | "some pr1ck called Saul" - never a customer; published third-party amplification inside Joel Walker's group and campaign chain | 285 | 8 | VISIBLE |
| 3 | Joel Walker | 2025-10-25 | "Soul from legion Killfeeds a pedo" | 284 | 42 | VISIBLE |
| 4 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-01 | "DRUNK TROLL LORD LEGION KILLFEED" | 185 | 6 | REMOVED |
| 5 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-08 | "Keep defending the kiddy fiddlers" | 178 | 21 | REMOVED |
| 6 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-09 | "will reset loop your server" - false sabotage | 269 | 13 | VISIBLE |
| 7 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-10 | Personal smear - false stalking accusation | 176 | 6 | REMOVED |
| 8 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-25 | Communities using Legion "banned" - commercial interference | 161 | 3 | REMOVED |
| 9 | Joel Walker | 2025-11-29 | "smokes meth on the regular" | 157 | 3 | REMOVED |
| 10 | Aaron Hafer (DayZ Editors admin/moderator) | 2026-02-16 | Moderator refusal to remove a comment recommending DayZ++ in response to a support request thread. | 170 | 1 | VISIBLE |
| 11 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-19 | Trustpilot-style smear spam targeting Legion Killfeed posted across DayZ Facebook groups 5-10 times. Identical in substance to Joel Walker's Trustpilot review removed same date. | 108 | 0 | VISIBLE |
| 12 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-19 | Trustpilot-style smear spam targeting DayZ Multi Tool: "highly recommended to avoid". Part of April 19 coordinated cross-service attack. | 108 | 0 | VISIBLE |
| 13 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-19 | Trustpilot-style smear spam targeting JinieBot: "SCAMMERS!!!" and "unprofessional management and predatory business practices". Part of April 19 coordinated cross-service attack. | 108 | 0 | VISIBLE |
| 14 | Joel Walker | 2026-04-19 | Trustpilot-style smear spam targeting DayZ++: "unprofessional management and predatory practices". Posted 5-10 times per service across multiple DayZ groups. | 108 | 0 | VISIBLE |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Tracked posts | 14 |
| Posts still visible | 8 |
| Total reports | 176 |
| Cumulative days visible | 2,342 |
| Pedophilia accusations | 3 posts |
| False criminal conduct | 2 posts |
| Commercial interference | 1 post |
| Meta Oversight Board referral | 2026-01-31 |
Meta's responsibility: The 14 August 2025 concerns notice, 176 report records, support chat, publication dates and later visibility captures establish actual notice, control and failure to prevent access. Meta did not block the continuing publications within seven days of compliant written complaints. It instead fragmented the reports and left eight tracked posts visible, including criminal, sexual and sabotage accusations in customer-acquisition groups. That conduct defeats the factual basis for a reasonable-access-prevention defence and aggravates the resulting harm.
Overview: Reddit hosts the single most strategically damaging publication: a persistent thread titled "Legion Kill feed, What's souls issue?" on r/DayZDiscussions, visible for 883 days as of 5 August 2026. The record includes 52 distinct reports, 9 ticket IDs, 4 admin messages, 2024 notice history, and 2025 re-notices while the thread and linked comments remained accessible.
Critical Factor: The thread now ranks as a top-3 Google search result for "Legion Killfeed." Google's AI overview feature has incorporated the defamatory statements into automated summaries - amplifying harm beyond Reddit's audience.
Concerns Notice Dates:
| Username | Date | Content | Real Identity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Obviously_Mario | 2024-01-24 | Original post | Mathew Trojanowski attribution; this was not the Reddit account that advertised Anon PVP |
| Hot_Ad6729 | 2024-03-05 | "total douche bag" | Papa Blunt (cancelled subscriber) |
| MongooseCandid2716 | 2024-04-10 | "Soul is a known Scammer... sells files for profit" | Ronald "Jarvis" Lund - sockpuppet (originally used DayZKillfeed.com Reddit account) |
| Brief_Ordinary1438 | 2024-05-23 | "code has malicious intent... avoided at all cost" | Mathew Trojanowski; this is the account that advertised Anon PVP |
| Brief_Ordinary1438 | 2024-07-18 | "scamming people for their tokens" | Trojanowski - second appearance |
| Brief_Ordinary1438 | 2024-09-18 | SQL injection, data theft accusations | Trojanowski - third appearance, escalated |
Obviously_Mario setup chronology: Obviously_Mario successfully configured the killfeed during beta using a legitimate working token. About 24 hours later the account changed that token to “Bah Bah Black Sheep”. Brodie was monitoring the console, saw the change and immediately removed the bot from the Discord. Obviously_Mario then sent an invite through the bot's DMs. When Brodie joined, the server was empty. The account first presented as a mother setting up a server and, when questioned about the substituted token, switched to presenting as a child “just trying to play with my mum”. The account claimed not to know Soul, despite having been in Soul's server for several years. This conduct and the later Reddit publication are materially different from an ordinary failed setup or customer complaint.
The Reddit account shown advertising Anon PVP is Brief_Ordinary1438. The account is attributed to Mathew Trojanowski through the preserved Reddit and server records.
See 6.5 Google (Search Amplification) for the detailed Google timeline related to Reddit amplification.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Days visible from anchor | 883 |
| Full months visible | 29 |
| Distinct reports | 52 |
| Ticket IDs | 9 |
| Admin messages | 4 |
| Notice history | 2024 notice / 2025 re-notice |
| Identified sockpuppet accounts | 3+ |
Reddit's responsibility: The 2024 notice history, formal re-notice, 52 reports, nine tickets, four admin messages, moderator records, account action and continuing URL captures establish actual knowledge and access control. Reddit did not take reasonable access-prevention steps within seven days. It left the publication available as a search trust barrier, banned a Legion profile and stopped answering repeated notices. Section 39A preserves the access-prevention remedy against a non-party intermediary.
Overview: Discord is where the harassment was coordinated and originated, and where Soul's business operates. Uniquely, Discord punished the victim rather than the perpetrators - Soul's account received strikes and restrictions while documented reports of doxxing, threats, rape threats, suicide encouragement, and child targeting were dismissed.
The January export retains 30 Discord ticket IDs, and the later coordinated-abuse complaint is ticket 66248829, producing 31 documented Discord tickets overall. Ticket 30339510 records the 23 November 2022 report about Mason Stockton posting Brodie's address, using alternate accounts and operating an IP-pulling server. Discord opened an investigation, encouraged screenshots and additional IDs, and IP-banned Stockton. The report was later scrubbed from Brodie's account but survived in the data export. The June coordinated client and mass-report abuse complaint is ticket 66248829.
17624761, 18064826, 20701184, 30339510, 30414871, 39629296, 39648357, 39683754, 42296956, 42297180, 42297244, 47695614, 56784327, 58942905, 61451054, 61451498, 61451749, 61465755, 61691061, 61770202, 61771050, 61771054, 61942766, 61943102, 61943467, 61973127, 61977122, 62150638, 62421836 and 62422711.
| Date | Ticket | Issue | Discord Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-11-23 | #30339510 | Mason Stockton doxxing address | Investigation opened; screenshots and IDs encouraged; Stockton IP-banned |
| 2022-11-25 | #30414871 | Others posting address | Generic acknowledgment |
| 2024-01-08 | #42296956 | Appeal - rape threats, child images, code theft | Redirected to form |
| 2025-10-16 | #61451498 | Ongoing harassment | Filed |
| 2025-11-17 | - | Harassment strike onSoul's account | Appeal filed |
| 2025-11-21 | - | Suicide threat in ticket | Closed in 3 minutes, no reply |
| 2026-01-12 | - | Account "very limited" - 4 violations | Mass reporter tool weaponised |
Perpetrators used a social media mass reporter tool (documented 2026-01-13) to generate false reports against Soul's Discord account, resulting in automated strikes. By January 12, 2026, Soul's account status was "very limited" with 4 active violations - all originating from the attackers' false reports.
Attribution chain: Mathew Trojanowski's operation is tied to the coordinated mass-reporting and disruption through Feather's screenshots of the DDoS brag, the copied DayZ server carrying “with love - The Collective”, and the separate records identifying The Collective as Trojanowski's current server. The same sequence includes partner-name spam, Discord intrusion, mass-report encouragement and customer-facing client failures.
Legal significance: The report receipts, three-minute ticket closure, account-standing screens and later reversals prove operational harm and an unreasonable response. Discord's handling increased the disruption, causation record and aggravated harm. The later reversals did not return the lost business time, repair account standing during the affected period or undo the damage caused by punishing the target of the campaign.
Overview: Google distributed the coordinated attack through ordinary results, result panels, snippets, “Discussions and forums”, AI Mode, AI Overviews and Lumen publication. It repeatedly placed hostile Facebook posts, Reddit accusations, Trustpilot material, skynetvslegion.com and AggroPVP.com beside Legion's official business pages. The harm was not confined to one Reddit thread.
The current Google scorecard records 220 counted handling entries, 71 evidence rows, 71 ticket references, 77 reported or reviewed URL entries and 19 unique ticket/request IDs. They are 0-4685000039839, 0-7685000040341, 0-9681000041045, 1-3859000040385, 1-6651000040596, 2-7896000040770, 2-9213000040525, 4-4314000040578, 4-6120000040834, 5-3327000041185, 5-8357000041583, 6-6692000040714, 6-7168000040663, 7-1475000041317, 7-4274000039113, 7-6851000041029, 8-0020000041441, 8-8385000040209 and 9-5176000040649. The correspondence repeatedly supplied the source publications, screenshots, account links, business records, search captures and legal explanation. Google's later requests often demanded information already present in those earlier cases.
A search for Legion displayed the Reddit accusation that the bot collected, sold or deleted customer files. The same result page displayed a Facebook result titled “Setting up legion killfeed on discord?” with Joel Walker's accusation that Legion would reset-loop a server and force its players to leave. Other Google captures surfaced Joel Walker's paedophilia smears, MDZGA competitor promotion, the hostile skynetvslegion.com site, AggroPVP.com material, Trustpilot reviews and review stars, and Google-generated reliability warnings.
The Facebook snippet was especially misleading. Google used a neutral setup-question title while the visible extract carried a hostile accusation from the GoMining/MDZGA-linked publication chain. The title made the accusation look like ordinary setup guidance and detached it from the competitor and harassment context that produced it.
Google AI Mode and AI Overview then presented those source publications as independent summaries. One result described Legion as popular and feature-rich, then inserted reliability and billing warnings and promoted MDZGA as a “hardware-first” alternative. The source cards included the hostile Facebook thread and Trustpilot. That transformed coordinated competitor material into Google-authored comparison text at the exact point a prospective customer was deciding which service to use.
| Date | Request | Google action | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-09 to 2026-04 | 7-4274000039113 and related cases | Google received repeated removal demands and sent notices to Lumen on at least 17 September, 24 October, 13 January, 15 February and 19 April | The accusations remained searchable while the complaint itself was copied into another public record |
| 2026-02-15 to 2026-04-24 | 1-6651000040596, 2-7896000040770 and 4-6120000040834 | Google rejected privacy and removal requests for the hostile Facebook result and continued using the “Setting up legion killfeed on discord?” title and reset-loop accusation | Facebook defamation and competitor promotion remained in search and AI-generated comparisons |
| 2026-05-20 to 2026-06-02 | 7-1475000041317 | Google first demanded proof that Facebook and Reddit reporting, support, appeal and legal routes had been exhausted; Brodie supplied that proof on 2 June | Google knew that the source platforms had refused or ignored the same coordinated campaign |
| 2026-05-20 | 8-8385000040209 | Google refused action on skynetvslegion.com, Reddit and Facebook URLs and demanded more screenshots and country-edition details for AI Mode and AI Overview | Hostile sites, social posts and generated summaries remained part of the same search attack |
| 2026-06-05 to 2026-07-11 | 6-6692000040714 | Google repeatedly required the Australian business location, jurisdiction, URLs and facts already supplied, then returned responses that did not address the consolidated notice | Dated captures on 20 and 22 June, 30 June, 1 July and 9 July show continued search publication after Google's claimed fixes and refusals |
Google's own result panel stated that the material typically appeared for searches outside Australia. Legion's payment record confirms the international audience: 1,357 international payments compared with 66 domestic payments, or 95.36 percent international. Australia-only handling could not repair a business reputation damaged in the markets where almost all customers were located.
Google was repeatedly given the exact URLs, screenshots, wording, business identity, Australian legal basis, source-platform report history and contradictions inside the source material. It claimed that results were removed or not displayed, reversed that position, demanded the same information again and continued to rank, excerpt and generate the attack. Its search and AI systems made the coordinated publications look independent and neutral, magnifying their cumulative business effect.
| Actor | Trustpilot | Discord | TikTok | Other | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mathew Trojanowski | Yes (OP + 3 comments) | Yes (direct Mathew, Kamy, Kyle, Killfeed review and Anthony account presentations) | Yes (indirect) | Yes (orchestrator) | Yes (attempted downplay; TikTok reviewed & acted) | AggroPVP.com doxxing site |
| Edward Griggs Jr. | Yes | Yes (2 reviews) | Yes (spam comments) | Yes (suicide encouragement) | Yes (attempted downplay; TikTok reviewed & acted) | Skynet staff / BigFatMods |
| Mason Stockton | Yes | Yes ("havasu") | Yes | Yes (doxxing 2022) | Yes | whitelist.gg; DayZ++ partner using Pups |
| Joel Walker | Yes | Yes | Yes (11 posts) | Yes | Yes | Make DayZ Great Again Killfeed; group admin |
| Danny Hayes | Yes | Yes (1 review) | Yes (competitor call to arms) | Yes | Yes | UK rival |
| Brett Jones | Yes (amplified) | Yes | Yes (pedo comment) | Yes (pedo comment + recruiting dogpilers) | Yes | Customer; cancelled over disabled DMs, returned, then joined the pile-on |
| Daniel Santos | Yes | Yes | Yes (trigger post) | Yes | Yes | Customer; paid DayZ modding services |
| Adam Cooper | Yes | Yes | Yes (agent of Walker) | Yes | Yes | Non-customer; appeared to act for Walker |
Trojanowski, Griggs, Stockton, Buchanan and Lund coordinated together and were, at one point, staff, partners or collaborators around DayZBoosterZ. The later record includes Trojanowski's multiple account presentations, Griggs acting as Skynet staff, Stockton using Pups while steering customers to DayZ++, Buchanan operating OzzieHousos and UntoldTruthy, and Lund's competing killfeed activity. Their shared working history makes the repeated overlap of accounts, reviews and promotions probative of coordination. The PayPal purchase and t.showler email trail support Taylor Showler as the identity behind OzzieHousos.
| Platform | Notice Date | Content Still Visible | Duration After Notice |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-10-01 | Full thread | 7+ months | |
| 2025-08-14 | 8 of 14 posts | 8+ months | |
| Trustpilot | 2025-08-06 | Two Ray Smith reviews, the Kyle review and the “Killfeed review” are visible at 20 July 2026; Trustpilot’s consumer warning is also visible | Continuing after repeated notice |
| Discord | 2022-11-23 (first) | Incidents ongoing | 3+ years |
| Date | Perpetrator | Platform | Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-06-05 | Edward Griggs Jr. | Discord | "Kill yourself" - targeting Soul's children simultaneously |
| 2024-06-20 | Edward Griggs Jr. | Discord | Continued suicide encouragement coordinated with Trojanowski |
| 2024-09-13 | Griggs + Trojanowski | Discord | Wished suicide on Soul |
| 2026-01-05 | Edward Griggs Jr. + Trojanowski | TikTok | Soul raised 2024 Discord suicide encouragement context; Griggs and Trojanowski attempted to downplay.TikTok reviewed and acted immediately. No suicide encouragement occurred on TikTok - the original incidents were Discord (2024). |
| 2025-11-17 | Soul (victim) | Discord | "Maybe Suicide Is The Only Way" - documented result of campaign |
| 2025-11-21 | - | Discord | Suicide-related ticket closed in 3 minutes with no response |
Danny Hayes on Facebook (July 2025) explicitly instructed others to "do a PayPal chargeback/refund and don't use Legion again" - coordinating fraudulent chargebacks. Evidence shows a wave of PayPal disputes followed within days.
An attributed customer statement directly connects the public campaign to a lost subscription. The customer states that the Facebook and Trustpilot rumours made him uncomfortable and that the volume of drama caused him to cancel Legion and use another bot. After reviewing the evidence, he concluded that Legion and Brodie were not at fault and returned. The cancellation records the campaign changing a customer's purchasing decision; the later return records the additional unpaid work required to undo that damage.
Attributed customer statement · surrounding Discord context · request for the explanation
The subscription-loss calculation uses the retained private, non-anonymised PayPal subscription ledger. The public anonymised transaction export mirrors the transaction and category fields with customer identifiers removed, and the month-by-month reconciliation records the completed-receipt totals used below. The calculation counts completed USD subscription receipts and excludes donations, refunds, chargebacks, dispute holds and unrelated categories from monthly subscription receipts.
May 2026 is excluded from completed-month subscription decline calculations because the ledger contains only a partial May export. Subscription damage can lag by a renewal cycle, so the completed-month window remains July 2024 through April 2026.
The baseline is the completed paid-operation average from January 2025 through August 2025: US$1,007.96 per month. April 2026 produced US$606.97 from 75 customers, leaving a monthly gap of US$400.99.
| Month | Subscription receipts | Rows | Customers | Baseline gap | AUD est. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-09 | US$862.97 | 107 | 105 | US$144.99 | A$224.74 |
| 2025-10 | US$876.48 | 112 | 104 | US$131.48 | A$203.80 |
| 2025-11 | US$727.00 | 91 | 91 | US$280.96 | A$435.49 |
| 2025-12 | US$709.99 | 89 | 86 | US$297.97 | A$461.86 |
| 2026-01 | US$661.97 | 86 | 82 | US$345.99 | A$536.29 |
| 2026-02 | US$595.94 | 70 | 68 | US$412.02 | A$638.63 |
| 2026-03 | US$610.95 | 74 | 69 | US$397.01 | A$615.37 |
| 2026-04 | US$606.97 | 80 | 75 | US$400.99 | A$621.54 |
Accrued completed-month subscription gap: September 2025 through April 2026 totals US$2,411.42 / A$3,737.70 against the January-August 2025 baseline.
Calculation basis: every AUD estimate uses the fixed planning rate of A$1.55 per US$1. The cleaned ledger records completed receipts, customer counts and the measured decline. The customer's written statement directly links the Facebook and Trustpilot campaign to a cancellation, while the wider loss model combines that direct loss with the dated publication, rating, search and subscription records.
| Month | Subscription receipts | Rows | Customers |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-07 | US$533.45 | 62 | 58 |
| 2024-08 | US$651.96 | 74 | 71 |
| 2024-09 | US$635.47 | 73 | 72 |
| 2024-10 | US$812.47 | 100 | 92 |
| 2024-11 | US$737.47 | 96 | 92 |
| 2024-12 | US$924.47 | 115 | 107 |
| 2025-01 | US$986.47 | 124 | 118 |
| 2025-02 | US$995.45 | 126 | 120 |
| 2025-03 | US$1,018.96 | 131 | 129 |
| 2025-04 | US$1,015.95 | 132 | 128 |
| 2025-05 | US$923.97 | 120 | 119 |
| 2025-06 | US$984.97 | 127 | 124 |
| 2025-07 | US$997.96 | 126 | 122 |
| 2025-08 | US$1,139.96 | 131 | 123 |
| 2025-09 | US$862.97 | 107 | 105 |
| 2025-10 | US$876.48 | 112 | 104 |
| 2025-11 | US$727.00 | 91 | 91 |
| 2025-12 | US$709.99 | 89 | 86 |
| 2026-01 | US$661.97 | 86 | 82 |
| 2026-02 | US$595.94 | 70 | 68 |
| 2026-03 | US$610.95 | 74 | 69 |
| 2026-04 | US$606.97 | 80 | 75 |
| Event | Date | Revenue impact |
|---|---|---|
| Trustpilot attack / review-reinstatement trail | 2024 onward | Creates the review-platform damage trail. Reinstatement and filtering records remain relevant, and four false one-star publications are currently visible. |
| Facebook brigading and public pile-on activity | 2025-07 onward | September 2025 fell to US$862.97, below the US$1,007.96 baseline. |
| Joel Walker pedophilia accusation post and republication path | 2025-10 onward | November 2025 fell to US$727.00, the sharpest post-trigger completed-month drop. |
| Search amplification, review abuse, refusal paths, report handling, and continued publication after notice | 2025-11 to 2026-04 | April 2026 receipts were US$606.97, down US$400.99 against baseline. |
| Ray Smith / R-y_smith Trustpilot review and Discord-context dispute | 2026-05 | Post-April aggravating event. Not included as completed-month subscription loss until a complete later ledger confirms renewal-cycle impact. |
| Metric | Period | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Subscription peak month | 2025-08 | US$1,139.96 |
| Baseline average | Jan 2025 - Aug 2025 | US$1,007.96 |
| April 2026 completed month | 2026-04 | US$606.97 |
| Completed-month decline | Baseline to Apr 2026 | -39.78% |
| Accrued lost subscription receipts | Sep 2025 - Apr 2026 | US$2,411.42 / A$3,737.70 |
The projection uses actual completed ledger receipts for September 2025 through April 2026, then carries the April 2026 completed-month figure flat for the next 12 months because May 2026 is partial.
The flat, 3.5%, 5% and 7.5% paths are transparent counterfactual scenarios, not independent forecasts or promises of what the business would have earned. Their arithmetic is reproducible from the retained ledger, but selection of the proper counterfactual, growth rate, loss period, mitigation and causal attribution requires financial and legal evidence beyond the ledger alone.
| Model | Monthly growth | Expected 20mo | Actual/flat 20mo | Lost USD | Lost AUD est. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flat baseline | 0.0% | US$20,159.23 | US$12,935.91 | US$7,223.32 | A$11,196.14 |
| Mature ledger CMGR | 3.5% | US$28,504.82 | US$12,935.91 | US$15,568.91 | A$24,131.82 |
| Moderate growth | 5.0% | US$33,329.20 | US$12,935.91 | US$20,393.29 | A$31,609.60 |
| High growth | 7.5% | US$43,649.44 | US$12,935.91 | US$30,713.53 | A$47,605.97 |
| Category | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lost subscription revenue | A$11,196 | A$31,610 | A$47,606 |
| Reporting, correspondence, preservation and rebuttal time | A$141,680 | A$212,520 | A$283,360 |
| Refund / chargeback / dispute-hold impact | A$708 | A$708 | A$708 |
| Stranded 17-month beta, launch trust and goodwill | A$289,000 | A$422,385 | A$578,000 |
| Total special damages | A$442,584 | A$667,223 | A$909,674 |
Direct legal, hosting, medical and other out-of-pocket expenditure is excluded unless supported by invoices and a non-overlapping causal basis. The subscription line uses the ledger model in Sections 9A-9F; it is not added twice.
The dated record identifies 504 separate days on which Brodie researched, captured, checked, reported, answered, preserved or organised the campaign evidence. Many dates contain several independent tasks. Individual legal and platform emails took more than 12 hours to research, draft, fact-check, compare with the law and match to the underlying screenshots, messages and account history. The model therefore values each recorded date at 8, 12 or 16 hours and excludes every unrecorded workday.
| Evidence-date workload | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| 506 evidence dates | 504 x 8 hr | 504 x 12 hr | 504 x 16 hr |
| Total hours | 4,048 | 6,072 | 8,096 |
| Minimum replacement-labour value at A$35/hour | A$141,680 | A$212,520 | A$283,360 |
| Developer opportunity-cost basis | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hourly rate | A$65 | A$95 | A$130 |
| Hours | 4,048 | 6,072 | 8,096 |
| Lost productive-time value | A$263,120 | A$576,840 | A$1,052,480 |
The work includes reports, legal and regulator correspondence, repeated explanations to Meta and Google, unanswered Reddit notices, Trustpilot review disputes and the response to conduct Brodie directly identifies as criminal commercial coercion, Discord enforcement reversals, evidence capture, chronology construction, customer reassurance and public rebuttal. The model is a floor. It prices only the 504 dates represented in the public evidence index, excludes unrecorded workdays, and uses A$35 per hour instead of the A$65-A$130 developer replacement rates used for the beta. At those developer rates, the same 4,048-8,096 hours have a replacement value between A$263,120 and A$1,052,480. That higher opportunity-cost range is disclosed but is not added to the totals, preventing double counting with the beta and goodwill components.
The free beta ran from February 2023 through June 2024: 17 months, about 516 days and an existing development estimate of 4,446 hours. At A$65-A$130 per hour, replacement value is approximately A$289,000-A$578,000. Mathew Trojanowski’s 24 January 2024 Reddit publication appeared during the beta, became search-indexed and damaged the customer trust the free period was designed to build before paid launch. The loss is therefore not limited to subscriptions cancelled after launch; it includes the benefit of a 17-month trust-building investment being stranded and wasted at the point it should have converted into goodwill and paying users.
| Beta valuation | Rate | Development hours | Replacement value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative | A$65/hour | 4,446 | A$289,000 |
| Moderate | A$95/hour | 4,446 | A$422,385 |
| Senior competitive | A$130/hour | 4,446 | A$578,000 |
The special-damages table values the stranded beta, launch trust and goodwill at the existing A$289,000 to A$578,000 development replacement range. Mathew Trojanowski's search-indexed publication struck while the free service was building the customer confidence required for paid conversion. The later reviews, hostile sites, Facebook posts and Google summaries kept the same trust damage active through launch and the following two years.
Development estimate: the 4,446 hours is Brodie's retained build estimate for the 17-month beta. The valuation uses the stated A$65, A$95 and A$130 replacement rates and can be reconciled against the source-control history and dated project records supporting the development period.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Servers lost from active-server peak to documented trough | 81 |
| Average Nitrado monthly cost estimate | A$30.23 |
| Total Nitrado servers using Legion since beta | ~1,272 |
| Monthly ecosystem loss estimate | A$2,448.63 |
| Annual ecosystem loss estimate | A$29,383.56 |
From 1 July 2026, the statutory maximum for non-economic loss is A$520,000. This is a most serious case. The coordinated campaign used false paedophilia, fraud, hacking, theft, malicious code, sabotage, drug abuse, stalking and dishonesty accusations to destroy trust in Brodie and the service he alone develops and operates. It continued for years, crossed every major customer touchpoint, involved his partner and children, included suicide encouragement, doxxing and rape threats, and continued after formal notices and the A$1,007,000 Calderbank offer of 14 August 2025.
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Gravity | Calling a sole developer a paedophile, fraudster, thief, hacker and saboteur destroys the personal and technical trust required for customers to grant a Discord bot access to their communities and server information. |
| Duration | The continuing campaign period runs for 1,137 days from 25 June 2023 to 5 August 2026. The record also preserves earlier conduct from 2020 and Discord conduct from 2022. The attack continued for eleven months after the August 2025 Calderbank offer. |
| Coordinated publication | Competitors and linked accounts supplied and repeated the accusations through Trustpilot, Facebook, Reddit, Discord and hostile websites. Google then ranked, excerpted and synthesised the same material in search results, snippets, AI Mode and AI Overview. |
| Purchase-stage review attack | The Trustpilot chronology contains 24 negative review records, at least 87 keep-online or reinstatement or reactivation decisions through 5 August 2026 and a conservative 1,038 directly confirmed publication days. The 1 August Joel Walker removal is recorded separately rather than back-filled into that total. Two Ray Smith reviews, Kyle and Killfeed review remained visible together with Trustpilot's own consumer warning. |
| Competitor identities | Kamy, Havasu, Anthony Buchanan, Danny Hayes, Griggs, Joel Walker, Kyle and Killfeed review are competitors. Kyle, Kamy, Killfeed review and the Anthony review account are Mathew Trojanowski. Buchanan is the separate DayZBoosterZ competitor. |
| Facebook reach | Fourteen tracked posts generated 176 reports and 2,342 cumulative visible days. Eight remained visible on 5 August 2026, including customer-facing criminal and child-sex-abuse smears in DayZ groups used to acquire customers. |
| Reddit and beta damage | Mathew Trojanowski's 24 January 2024 Reddit publication landed during the 17-month free beta, became search indexed and damaged the trust that 4,446 development hours were intended to convert into paying users. The measured thread and comments remained visible for at least 883 days through 5 August 2026. |
| Google distribution | Google carried more than the Reddit thread. It surfaced Facebook posts, skynetvslegion.com, AggroPVP.com, Trustpilot material and hostile DayZ pages in search results, mismatched snippets and generated answers, then claimed fixes, reversed position and required the same facts again. |
| Operational damage | Discord was both Legion's delivery platform and an attack surface. Doxxing, impersonation, mass reporting, client-lag interference and account restrictions disrupted customer support and the operation of the service. Some punishments were later reversed, but the lost time and disruption were not restored. |
| Personal damage | The record preserves suicidal ideation, social isolation, home-address publication, references to Brodie's partner and children, more than 100 graphic rape-threat messages, and the continuing effect of being branded a paedophile and criminal in the communities where he works. |
| No correction | No complete correction or apology exists. Material remains visible, is restored after removal, is repeated in search, or is replaced by worse accusations after complaint. |
This is one coordinated attack, not a collection of unrelated platform disputes. Mathew Trojanowski, Edward Anthony Griggs Jr. and the other competing operators and accounts created or repeated the accusations. Trustpilot, Facebook, Reddit, Discord and hostile sites carried them to distinct audiences. Google converted them into neutral-looking discovery results and generated answers. Each surface reinforced the others and made coordinated repetition look like independent corroboration.
| Service | Role in the attack | Damage caused | Continuing position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trustpilot | Purchase-stage reviews and Trustpilot's own warning | Competitor one-star reviews damaged conversion and ratings. Repeated restoration multiplied publication time. Trustpilot's warning added a direct accusation that Legion misused review content. | Two Ray Smith reviews, Kyle, Killfeed review and the consumer warning were visible on 14 July 2026. |
| DayZ community groups and customer acquisition | Reset-loop, sabotage, criminal and child-sex-abuse accusations reached server owners and potential subscribers inside the groups where services are recommended. | Eight of 14 tracked posts remained visible after 176 reports and 2,342 cumulative visible days. | |
| Long-form accusation, search discovery and false independence | The January 2024 publication struck during beta, was indexed by Google and became a durable trust barrier for users researching Legion. | The measured thread and comments remained visible for at least 883 days; Reddit banned a Legion profile and did not answer repeated notices. | |
| Discord | Product delivery, support and direct access to Legion users | Threats, doxxing, impersonation, hostile contact and reporting abuse occurred inside the platform required to deliver Legion. Enforcement then disrupted the reporting account. | Some punishments were reversed. The operational harm, customer concern and evidence burden remained. |
| Search ranking, snippets, AI Mode and AI Overview | Google distributed Facebook posts, Reddit, Trustpilot, skynetvslegion.com, AggroPVP.com and other hostile sources as neutral search information. | Repeated legal-removal cases did not resolve the source pages, snippets, hostile domains or generated answers as a connected problem. |
TikTok contrast: TikTok reviewed the underlying Discord context and acted. The public rebuttal videos also reached substantial audiences without generating the accusations at issue. That response proves that contextual review and effective action were possible.
The decisions below show the scale applied to grave online imputations, sustained campaigns, competitive motive, continuation after notice and cumulative reputational harm. They support an assessment at the upper end of the statutory maximum before aggravated and economic loss are added.
| Decision | Reported award | Comparison |
|---|---|---|
| Bauer Media Pty Ltd v Wilson [2018] VSCA 68 | A$600,000 after appeal | Serial publication and substantial reputation and personal harm. |
| Wagner v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 201 | A$3.7 million across four plaintiffs | Sustained campaign across broadcast and online outlets with compounding harm. |
| Rolph v Smurthwaite [2023] FCA 1556 | A$400,000 | Internet publication carrying a paedophilia imputation. |
| Rau v Wieland [2021] SADC 99 | A$350,000 | Online publication of grave sexual-misconduct accusations. |
| Barilaro v Google LLC [2022] FCA 650 | A$715,000 | YouTube and Google publication, continuation after notice and aggravated harm. |
| Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 496 | A$2.9 million at first instance | Sustained campaign, grave sexual imputations and extensive economic and personal harm. |
| Martin v Najem [2022] NSWDC 479 | A$300,000 plus injunction | Social-media campaign using an exceptionally destructive accusation. |
| Colagrande v Kim [2022] FCA 409 | A$420,000 | Competitor online publication and a commercial motive to damage reputation. |
| Scenario | Amount | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Conservative | A$460,000 | Grave sexual and criminal accusations, years of repetition, personal harm and direct damage to a trust-dependent business. |
| Moderate | A$500,000 | Coordinated publication across the full customer journey, continuing visibility, family targeting and destruction of beta-built trust. |
| High | A$520,000 | The statutory maximum is justified by the paedophilia accusations, multi-year coordinated attack, continued publication after notice and exceptional need for vindication. |
Aggravated damages compensate the additional hurt and reputation damage caused by the way the attack was conducted and prolonged. The conduct was deliberate, competitive, retaliatory and escalatory. It continued after reports, legal notices, platform case numbers, regulator complaints and the August 2025 Calderbank offer.
| Aggravating conduct | What occurred |
|---|---|
| Competitive orchestration | Competing operators and linked accounts repeated the same themes, promoted replacement services and used false reviews and community posts to divert users from Legion. |
| Code theft and commercial exploitation | Mathew Trojanowski used Legion code to operate a competing service and then drove the January 2024 Reddit publication and linked account campaign that damaged trust during the beta. |
| Account network | Kyle, Kamy, Killfeed review and the Anthony review account are Mathew Trojanowski. Havasu, Buchanan, Hayes, Griggs and Walker are competitors. Their publications are part of the same attack. |
| Continuation after notice | Reports and formal notices were followed by continued Facebook and Reddit publication, repeated Trustpilot restoration, Google resurfacing, edited accusations and Trustpilot's own warning. |
| At least 87 keep-online or reinstatement decisions | The dated decision audit records 76 reinstatement events through 5 July 2026, then six further decisions: Ray Smith and Kyle on 6 July; Kyle case 02961099 and Ray Smith case 02649286 on 9 July; and Ray Smith cases 02953866 and 03012716 on 13 July. |
| Criminal commercial coercion and attempted extortion by Trustpilot | Trustpilot demanded that Legion remove authorised customer statements, directed Legion to Trustpilot's Share & promote products, threatened a public warning, account and search penalties and legal action, refused complete disassociation, continued the false reviews and copied a Revenue Technology address into the enforcement chain. |
| Worse replacement accusations | Ray Smith replaced the documented support chronology with false accusations of deception, lying, reporting-system manipulation and unfair trade practices. Trustpilot treated the worse publication as a response to the complaint and left no effective fresh reporting path. |
| Family and child targeting | The campaign used Brodie's partner and children, included children's images and combined family references with suicide encouragement and home-address publication. |
| Suicide encouragement | Griggs and Trojanowski told Brodie to kill himself while the record already showed suicidal ideation. One Discord suicide-related ticket was closed in three minutes. |
| Doxxing, threats and impersonation | AggroPVP.com published home-address material. Fake Soul accounts, real-world intimidation and more than 100 graphic rape-threat messages expanded the attack beyond ordinary business criticism. |
| Victim punishment | Discord restrictions, Reddit account action and TikTok promotion disruption landed on the person preserving and answering the attack. Later Discord reversals did not restore the lost work, reach or customer confidence. |
| Financial sabotage | The campaign used chargeback encouragement, competitor recommendations, copied tools, one-star reviews and public warnings at the exact points where customers decide whether to trust and pay Legion. |
| No correction | No complete apology or correction has been issued. The attack remains visible through current reviews, Trustpilot's warning, Facebook posts, Reddit, hostile domains and Google surfaces. |
| Period | Escalation | Damage |
|---|---|---|
| June 2023 | The business split became a coordinated code, identity and reputation dispute involving competing services. | The people with direct knowledge of Legion's code and market position acquired both the motive and material to attack customer trust. |
| 24 January 2024 | Mathew Trojanowski published the Reddit attack during the free beta. | The search-indexed publication struck before paid conversion and stranded 17 months and 4,446 hours of trust-building development. |
| 14 August 2025 | Brodie made the A$1,007,000 Calderbank offer after the campaign and loss were already substantial. | The offer was rejected and the conduct continued for another eleven months, adding later child-sex-abuse posts, review cycles, search amplification and platform conduct. |
| December 2025 | Trustpilot restoration cycles, Google and Lumen publication, Facebook reports and Discord enforcement converged. | The campaign moved from attacker publications into repeated platform decisions that preserved, restored or amplified the material. |
| January to June 2026 | Mass reporting, new reviews, Meta refusals, Google AI and snippet publication, Reddit legal notices, family references and Discord interference continued. | Brodie lost productive development time while hostile content remained discoverable and customer-facing. |
| July 2026 | Kyle, Killfeed review, Anthony and two Ray Smith publications appeared or remained visible. Trustpilot reversed profile wording, copied Revenue Technology and published its own consumer warning. | Trustpilot changed from repeatedly restoring third-party reviews to making its own adverse publication and coupling display directions with legal, account, search and reputational threats. Together, those actions constituted criminal commercial coercion and attempted extortion. |
| Service | Notice and action | Continuing harm | Aggravation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trustpilot | At least 87 keep-online or reinstatement decisions, repeated appeals, legal notices and profile edits. | Four false one-star publications and Trustpilot's consumer warning were visible on 14 July 2026. | Trustpilot restored reviews, prevented effective fresh reporting, reversed legal-notice wording, directed Legion to remove the display or use Trustpilot's Share & promote tools, and threatened legal, account, search and reputational consequences. |
| 176 reports across 14 tracked posts, including 42 reports concerning Joel Walker's explicit child-sex-abuse publication. | Eight tracked posts remained visible after 2,342 cumulative visible days. | Meta fragmented the connected campaign into isolated tickets and returned scripted refusals while the publications remained in customer-acquisition groups. | |
| 52 reports, nine tickets, four admin messages, the 2024 notice and later formal notices. | The measured thread and comments remained visible for at least 883 days through 5 August 2026 and continued feeding search results. | Reddit banned a Legion profile, did not answer repeated notices and preserved the beta-period trust barrier. | |
| Discord | Trust and Safety reports extend from 2022. Mass-report activity produced restrictions and one suicide-related report was closed in three minutes. | The account used to deliver Legion suffered disruption while threats, impersonation, doxxing and interference continued. | Discord punished the target first and corrected some decisions later, after the operational harm and evidence work had already occurred. |
| Cases 7-4274000039113, 1-6651000040596, 2-7896000040770, 4-6120000040834, 7-1475000041317, 8-8385000040209 and 6-6692000040714 carried repeated demands, refusals and reversals. | Facebook posts, Reddit, Trustpilot, skynetvslegion.com, AggroPVP.com, snippets and generated answers remained part of the search attack. | Google claimed correction, backtracked, requested the same explanation again and continued converting coordinated hostile sources into neutral-looking results. |
| Decision | Total award | Conduct | Comparison |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wagner v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd | A$3.7 million across four plaintiffs | Sustained broadcast and online campaign | The current attack involves more digital surfaces, longer duration and paedophilia accusations together with family targeting and suicide encouragement. |
| Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd | A$2.9 million at first instance | Sustained print and online campaign with grave sexual imputations | The current record adds competitive orchestration, review bombing, hostile sites, search synthesis and direct operational interference. |
| Barilaro v Google LLC | A$715,000 | Online publication and continuation after notice | The current conduct continued across five major services and hostile domains, before and after repeated notice. |
| Rolph v Smurthwaite | A$400,000 | Internet paedophilia imputation | The current attack repeated the same category of accusation as part of a years-long commercial and cross-platform campaign. |
| Colagrande v Kim | A$420,000 | Competitor online publication | The current record contains multiple competitor identities, linked accounts, copied code and coordinated publication. |
| Scenario | Amount | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Conservative | A$500,000 | Several years of coordinated publication, direct competitive motive, beta damage, family targeting and continuation after notice. |
| Moderate | A$800,000 | At least 87 keep-online or reinstatement decisions, cross-platform repetition, profile and warning publications, suicide encouragement, doxxing, threats and victim punishment. |
| High | A$1,200,000 | The campaign used copied code, competitors, linked accounts, platform systems and search amplification to escalate the same attack for years, including eleven months after the Calderbank offer. |
| Category | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| General damages | A$460,000 | A$500,000 | A$520,000 |
| Aggravated damages | A$500,000 | A$800,000 | A$1,200,000 |
| Special damages | A$442,584 | A$667,223 | A$909,674 |
| Total before interest and costs | A$1,402,584 | A$1,967,223 | A$2,629,674 |
This model prices 4,048, 6,072 or 8,096 mitigation hours at the minimum A$35 replacement-labour rate. It includes the full A$289,000 to A$578,000 replacement value of the 17-month beta once. It also includes the ledger-based subscription loss and the documented refund, chargeback and dispute-hold impact.
This alternative uses the same recorded work and substitutes A$65, A$95 and A$130 developer rates for the A$35 labour rate. It includes the beta replacement value once and is not added to the first model.
| Category | Conservative | Moderate | High |
|---|---|---|---|
| General damages | A$460,000 | A$500,000 | A$520,000 |
| Aggravated damages | A$500,000 | A$800,000 | A$1,200,000 |
| Lost subscription revenue | A$11,196 | A$31,610 | A$47,606 |
| Mitigation time at developer rate | A$263,120 | A$576,840 | A$1,052,480 |
| Refund, chargeback and dispute-hold impact | A$708 | A$708 | A$708 |
| Stranded 17-month beta, launch trust and goodwill | A$289,000 | A$422,385 | A$578,000 |
| Total before interest and costs | A$1,524,024 | A$2,331,543 | A$3,398,794 |
Both models include the beta loss once. Neither model includes pre-judgment interest, legal costs, expert costs, medical expenses, hosting expenses or further invoice-backed expenditure. Those amounts remain additional once proved and must not be used to reduce the beta, mitigation or goodwill loss.
Brodie made a A$1,007,000 offer on 14 August 2025 on a “without prejudice save as to costs” basis. Acceptance was required by 3 September 2025. The offer was made before the later Joel Walker paedophilia publications, the November and December 2025 subscriber decline, the January to July 2026 review cycles, the Google and Reddit escalation record, Trustpilot's consumer warning, Trustpilot's criminal commercial coercion and attempted extortion, and Ray Smith's July 2026 replacement accusations.
The present conservative total exceeds the Calderbank offer because the evidence and damage continued for another eleven months after the offer. The offer remains a costs document and a contemporaneous valuation of the dispute as it stood in August 2025. It is not included as a separate damages line and is not double counted.
Pre-judgment interest, legal costs and expert costs are excluded from the table. Interest must be calculated against the recoverable heads of loss and their actual dates. A flat percentage across every category would conceal the later 2026 publications and produce false precision. Section 40 costs and the rejected Calderbank offer remain separate from compensatory damages.
| Element | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Identification | Satisfied | The publications name Soul, Anthony Brodie, Legion Killfeed or the product and business operated solely by Brodie. |
| Publication to third parties | Satisfied | Public reviews, Facebook group posts, Reddit threads, Discord messages, hostile websites, search results, snippets and generated summaries were communicated to third parties. |
| Defamatory meaning | Satisfied | Paedophilia, fraud, theft, hacking, sabotage, malicious code, deception, regulatory breach and other criminal imputations directly lower Brodie in the estimation of ordinary reasonable people. |
| Serious harm | Satisfied | The archive records customer-facing reach, search visibility, rating damage, subscription decline, beta conversion harm, customer questions, family targeting, suicidal ideation and years of mitigation work. |
| Falsity and rebuttal | Documented | Code history, transaction records, bot logs, account records, the Ray Smith Discord chronology, business registration, review versions and the attackers' own contradictions disprove the core factual accusations. |
| Aggravation | Documented | Competitive motive, republication after notice, family targeting, suicide encouragement, doxxing, review restoration, worse replacement accusations, reporting obstruction and Trustpilot's own warning increased the harm. |
| Economic loss | Quantified | The cleaned ledger, completed-month comparison, 17-month beta record, mitigation-hour model, refund impact and goodwill evidence provide a traceable and reproducible loss model. |
The evidence records one coordinated attack. Mathew Trojanowski, Edward Anthony Griggs Jr., competing operators and linked accounts created, repeated and promoted the accusations. Facebook, Reddit, Discord, Trustpilot and hostile websites distributed them to the audiences Legion depended on. Google ranked, excerpted and synthesised the same sources. The attack, notice history, cumulative causation and resulting harm must be assessed together.
| Defence or exemption | Rebuttal of anticipated defences |
|---|---|
| Justification, s 25 | The accusations are false. There is no factual basis for paedophilia, theft, fraud, malicious code, token abuse, sabotage or deceptive trade practices. Code provenance, logs, transaction records, business registration and preserved conversations contradict them. |
| Contextual truth, s 26 | Ordinary support disputes, blunt language or an unfinished trader feature do not make the criminal, sexual, theft, fraud or regulatory accusations true and do not neutralise the additional reputational harm they caused. |
| Honest opinion, s 31 | Statements that Brodie is a paedophile, scammer, thief, hacker, fraudster or law-breaker are factual accusations. They were not presented as opinion based on identified proper material, and the documented contradictions destroy the claimed factual foundation. |
| Public interest, s 29A | The publishers did not verify the accusations, ignored contrary records, used competitor-linked accounts, edited accusations after complaint and repeated material for commercial and retaliatory purposes. That conduct is not a reasonable belief that publication was in the public interest. |
| Qualified privilege, s 30 | The publications were broadcast publicly to review readers, gaming groups, search users and unrelated community members. The false accusations, lack of verification, competitive motive and malice defeat reasonableness and privilege. |
| Digital intermediary defence, s 31A | The written complaints identified Brodie, the exact matter, its location and its defamatory character. The continuing publications were not blocked within seven days. Trustpilot instead restored reviews, removed reporting routes and published its own warning. |
| Innocent dissemination, s 32 | Actual notice, repeated reports, editorial control, removal and reinstatement decisions, profile edits and authored warning material defeat any claim that the relevant services lacked knowledge or capacity. |
| Caching, conduit or storage exemption, s 10C | The exemption is limited to services whose role was confined to caching, conduit or storage and which did not initiate, encourage, edit or promote the matter. Active review moderation, restoration, profile editing, warning publication and generated summaries fall outside that limited role. |
| Search-engine exemption, s 10D | The exemption covers automated search results and linked matter only where the provider's role is limited to the automated search process. It does not erase the separate access-prevention remedy under s 39A, and it does not decide liability for Google-authored AI summary wording or paid prioritisation. |
Use one chronology connecting each author, alias, competitor, platform action, search surface, notice, republication and resulting loss. Keep the exact words, URLs, dates and review versions as the proof schedule supporting the coordinated course of conduct.
Match each intended cause of action to a notice satisfying s 12A. Issue a fresh or supplemental notice for new July 2026 publications, later edits, Trustpilot's warning and any publication not already covered by exact location, imputation and serious-harm particulars.
Seek removal and correction from direct publishers. Plead injunctive relief against continuing publishers and use s 39A to seek access-prevention steps from non-party intermediaries after the required judgment, temporary injunction or final injunction threshold is met.
Plead one coordinated course of conduct and use the publication schedule to prove how the same attack moved through competitors, linked accounts, platforms, hostile sites and Google. Obtain forensic accounting evidence for subscriber loss, beta conversion, goodwill, mitigation time, refunds and developer opportunity cost.
Claim general, aggravated and special damages as separate heads. Calculate interest from the relevant loss dates, seek corrections and injunctions, preserve the 14 August 2025 Calderbank offer for costs, and avoid double counting the beta, developer opportunity cost and mitigation-hour components.
| Provision | Application |
|---|---|
| Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 10A | Serious harm is an element of the cause of action. The financial-loss limb applies if an excluded corporation brings the claim; Brodie's individual reputation remains separately protected. |
| Sections 10C and 10D | Limited exemptions for caching, conduit, storage and automated search functions. They do not create a general platform immunity. |
| Sections 12A and 12B | Content and pre-filing requirements for concerns notices. |
| Sections 25 to 32 | Justification, contextual truth, privilege, public interest, honest opinion, digital intermediary and innocent-dissemination defences. |
| Sections 34 and 35 | Damages must bear a rational relationship to harm. The 2026 non-economic maximum is A$520,000; aggravated damages are separate and not capped by that maximum. |
| Section 39 | Where more than one cause of action succeeds, the court may assess damages in a single sum. The coordinated publications and cumulative harm support that approach. |
| Section 39A | Access-prevention orders against non-party digital intermediaries after judgment or an applicable temporary or final injunction, even where the intermediary is not liable in damages. |
| Section 40 | Costs consequences, including unreasonable failure to make or accept settlement offers. |
| Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 100 | Pre-judgment interest on damages according to the court's assessment. |
| Decision | Relevance |
|---|---|
| Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Voller [2021] HCA 27 | Publication by operators who encouraged and facilitated third-party Facebook comments. It supplies the publication analysis that must now be read with the 2023 digital-intermediary reforms. |
| Trkulja v Google LLC [2018] HCA 25 | Defamatory capacity of Google search results and the legal treatment of search publication before the later statutory search-engine exemption. |
| Barilaro v Google LLC [2022] FCA 650 | Online platform publication, continuation after notice, aggravated harm and substantial damages. |
| Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 | Compensatory purpose of defamation damages and the effect of aggravating conduct on hurt and reputational harm. |
| Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 496 | Sustained campaign, grave imputations, aggravated damages and economic-loss assessment. |
| Colagrande v Kim [2022] FCA 409 | Online publication involving commercial rivalry and motive to damage reputation. |
| Rolph v Smurthwaite [2023] FCA 1556 | Serious internet defamation carrying a paedophilia imputation. |
| Houghton v Arms [2006] HCA 59 | Causation and proof of economic loss. |
| Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 | Costs consequences of an unreasonably rejected settlement offer. |
The TikTok catalogue is included here as supporting publication, response, reach, and mitigation context. It is loaded from the shared public TikTok data source used by the video gallery.
| Date | Title | Views | Likes | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Loading TikTok evidence... | ||||
The evidence is organised by date, person, platform, and issue. The public pages are for navigation and review; restricted financial material and private exhibits should be supplied directly to counsel when needed.
Mathew Trojanowski stole Legion's code and turned the theft into a coordinated campaign against Anthony Brodie, Legion Killfeed and Brodie's family. Through Skynet, Kamikaze, Kamy, Kyle, “Killfeed review”, Anthony, Brief_Ordinary1438 and other linked presentations, he repeated the same false accusations across Reddit, Discord, Trustpilot and customer communities. His 24 January 2024 Reddit publication attacked Legion during the 17-month free beta, when the service was building the trust required for paid conversion. Edward Griggs encouraged suicide, targeted Brodie's partner and children and repeated false criminal accusations. Mason Stockton published Brodie's address, attacked Legion while operating Whitelist.gg and steered customers toward competing services. Joel Walker used a Facebook group he administered and his competing killfeed to spread false paedophilia, meth and sabotage accusations. Danny Hayes, Daniel Santos and Brett Jones expanded the review-bombing and reporting attack. Ray Smith converted a disclosed support limitation into false accusations of deception, report manipulation, review suppression and unlawful trade practices after the preserved support chronology contradicted his public account.
Trustpilot used criminal commercial coercion and attempted extortion after formal notice. It forced Legion to remain associated with its platform, restored false reviews, blocked effective fresh reporting, reversed the legal-notice profile wording, authored its own consumer warning, demanded removal of authorised customer statements from killfeed.co, directed Legion toward Trustpilot's Share & promote products and threatened account restrictions, a hidden TrustScore, removal from search distribution and legal action. Its preserved record reached 608 report/email records, 168 case/thread references, 87 keep-online or reinstatement decisions and a conservative 1,038 directly confirmed publication days. Meta left eight tracked posts visible after 176 reports and 2,342 publication days. Reddit kept the beta-period thread online for 883 days after 52 reports, nine tickets and four admin messages. Discord's record reached 31 tickets while it punished the reporting account and lost visible report history. Google processed 220 handling entries yet continued converting the same false publications into search snippets, comparison results and generated answers.
The campaign changed customer purchasing decisions, reduced subscriptions, damaged ratings and conversion, stranded the trust-building value of the 17-month beta and diverted 4,048 to 8,096 hours into reports, evidence preservation, legal correspondence, customer reassurance and platform appeals. It also targeted Brodie's partner, children, home address and mental health. Using the A$35 replacement-labour rate, the quantified loss is A$1,402,584 to A$2,629,674, with a moderate figure of A$1,967,223, before interest and costs. Applying the alternative A$65, A$95 and A$130 developer rates produces A$1,524,024 to A$3,398,794, with a moderate figure of A$2,331,543. Both models include subscription loss, mitigation work and the full A$289,000 to A$578,000 replacement value of the beta once; the rate models are alternatives and are not added together.
The required outcome is complete removal and access prevention across the original posts, reviews, hostile sites, search results, snippets and generated answers; public correction and vindication; preservation and disclosure of platform, account, moderation, ranking and decision records; compensation for the full economic, reputational and aggravated harm; pre-judgment interest; and costs reflecting the rejected A$1,007,000 Calderbank offer and the conduct that continued after it. The campaign remained active on 20 July 2026, and none of its central harm had been fully corrected.
This was not ordinary competition or isolated customer criticism. It was coordinated code theft, harassment, false publication, family targeting and platform-enabled business interference that continued for years after detailed notice.